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ABSTRACT
This paper offers the Introduction to the Special Issue “Economic
and Financial Governance in the European Union after a decade of
Economic and Political Crises.” We introduce the five papers. We
distill three important lessons they offer for EU integration.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 14 April 2020
Accepted 27 April 2020
KEYWORDS
COVID-19; economic and
Monetary Union; Eurobonds;
European sovereign debt
crisis; global financial crisis
Policy Highlights
● Crises create consensus, especially when it comes to setting new objectives
● Crises do not always show the path towards these new objectives, or the choice of
institutional structure to accomplish these objectives;
● In the EU, institutional change in times of crisis is inspired by institutional struc-
tures previously conceptualized or adopted.
The 2008–09 Global Financial Crisis and the 2010–13 Sovereign Debt Crisis in
Europe had a dramatic impact on the European Union (EU). Both crises led to
a major contraction of the real economy and both revealed a number of funda-
mental weaknesses of the financial system of the EU. The consequences of these
crises were far-reaching. Besides the economic and political impact of these crises in
EU Member States, they also led to important changes in financial governance in
the EU.
Several institutional structures and governance changes made during and following
the crises aimed to avoid, and respond better to, potential future financial crises. In this
Special Issue we will zoom in on some of these new institutional structures and govern-
ance changes.1 Each paper of this Special Issue approaches an aspect of the governing
context that surrounds the Euro Area, considering historical relevance, sources of
influence for decision-making, and institutional design of the oversight of the Euro
Area. The aim here is not to provide a comprehensive account of all the crises-induced
changes that happened in the EU.2 In fact, the history of the EU is littered with change
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invoked by crisis (D’Erman and Verdun 2018). Rather, the papers provide an in-depth
analysis of a change, or a force that contributed to changes in Financial Governance in
the EU.
Below we first briefly introduce the five papers. Next, we reflect on the important
insights they offer for EU integration: exactly how do decisions regarding governance
structures in the EU come about; and, what lessons do we learn from these studies that
inform the broader literature? The historical context of European integration offers an
important reminder of the benefit of hindsight – that many of the significant critical
junctures of either deeper cooperation or divisive fragmentation are often better under-
stood with the both the passage of time and the tool of comparison and contrast. The five
papers of this Special Issue and our reflections offer some interesting insights and
hypotheses regarding the birth and evolution of institutions in the EU. We apply our
framework to analyze the likely forces at work as the EU and its member states combat
the consequences of COVID-19 in the years to come.
Mourlon-Druol (2020) situates the early European Economic Community’s (EEC)
attempts at articulating the need for a proposed single currency within the context of
a slowly-evolving crisis, namely slow economic growth in combination with high rates of
inflation in the 1970s. He argues that this period of economic headwind initiated some
notable developments within the EEC discussions surrounding the purpose and utility of
a possible single currency; and that these reflected in, and impacted how the EU
approached solutions to the perceived problems in the design of Economic and
Monetary Unification (EMU) after 2008.
An example of one of these post-2008 institutions is the European Systemic Risk
Board (ESRB), which Ehrmann and Schure (2020) analyze in composition and in action.
The design of the ESRB lacks direct regulatory power, which some see as an example of
the inefficiency of EU governance. However, the authors argue this conclusion is
premature. By making an in-depth comparison with the National Transportation and
Safety Board, a critically acclaimed United States (US) institution involved in systemic
risk management, they show that the lack of regulatory power may actually be an
important asset in the long run, as it might help safeguard the independence and
objectivity of the ESRB.
The examination of Ehrmann and Schure sheds some important light on the
context of leadership, and authority within EMU and the EU as a whole – a subject
taken up by Schöller (Ehrmann and Schure 2020). A recurring question is whether
institutions at the supranational level are “all bark but no bite”? Yet, if they are not,
then does the supranational level intrude too far into the domestic decision-making
prerogatives of spending and taxation? Schöller (Schoeller 2020) focuses on the role of
Germany during the Euro Area crisis in this context. Germany has been variously
labelled as a “reluctant hegemon” (Bulmer and Patterson 2013) and a “ordoliberal
leader” (Young 2014) in terms of its responses to the sovereign debt crisis. Schöller
shows that the record of German leadership after 2008 has been mixed: Germany’s
willingness to lead in recommending austerity policies helped to enhance obtaining
EU competence in banking supervision, while, at the same time, its disinclination from
considering burden-sharing policies weakened the development of financial assistance
institutions.
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Henning (2020) unveils a perhaps surprising source of influence behind the design of
new EU institutions after 2008: the United States Government. Henning details the
timing and nature of US assistance in terms of the advice of US policymakers, as well
as through the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The US sought to contain financial
contagion for its own purposes. In doing so, it actively supported the development of new
policies and mechanisms to strengthen the EMU framework. Henning’s contribution
shows that the US Government’s influence on the European Union is a matter of both the
past and the present.
The last contribution, by Demertzis and Wolff (2020) highlights the question whether
the current EMU governance structure has essentially been completed in the past decade.
Specifically, their analysis looks at the institutional steps that would fix the issue of the
“asymmetrical EMU” (Verdun 1996), that is, monetary union without a fiscal union (see
also Howarth and Verdun 2020). Demertzis and Wolff argue that the steps are, first, the
completion of the Banking Union; second, the centralization of funds and delivery of
some public goods at the EMU level; and third, the full federalization of critical economic
functions. By describing the pragmatic initiatives needed for solving the incongruities of
EMU, Demertzis and Wolff also articulate the inherent political tensions that underscore
the reasons for having arrived at the asymmetric design of the EMU in the first place.
The findings in this Special Issue seek to contribute towards the research on how
actors in the EU reach decisions about the governance structure of EMU. We draw three
lessons from the contributions in this Special Issue: (1) Crises foster consensus. They
clarify the need for new objectives; yet (2) Crises do not always show the path towards
those new objectives or the shape of the institutional solution; (3) Chosen solutions in
times of crisis are inspired by models previously conceptualized or adopted.
Lesson 1. The crises that hit the EU resulted in a broad consensus among politicians
and policy makers regarding the need for change. The crises even led to a degree of
consensus regarding what some of the necessary changes had to be. As such crises are
important catalyzers for institutional change. For example, Ehrmann and Schure (2020)
mention that institutions for macro-prudential policy sprung up internationally after
2008, besides the ESRB in the EU. However, the Special Issue contributions show that
change takes time and may perhaps stall, even in the context of a broad consensus
regarding a change that is deemed necessary. We believe this characterization applies to
the Banking Union: there is broad consensus regarding the need for it, through this
project is not yet completed as of yet.
Lesson 2. Notwithstanding the increased clarity, the crises that hit the EU did not
establish consensus about everything. There is for example disagreement about the
desired finalité of the EU or EMU. The crises also do not inform actors about how to
reach decisions about the new governance structure. The finalité for EMU in Demertzis
and Wolff (2020) includes fiscal union, besides monetary union and they argue that
importance alone is not sufficient for reaching that end goal; hence the need for following
a carefully designed sequence of steps towards a more symmetric EMU.
The final lesson we draw from the Special Issue contributions concerns how institu-
tional change happens. The Governance and International Relations literatures on this
subject distinguish several complementary perspectives on the dynamics of post-2008
institutional changes:
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● A historical institutionalist perspective, which couches decisions as being embedded
within the prevailing institutional design of the EU as a whole (Verdun 2015)
● An intergovernmental framework which asserts that responses to crises were limited
by member state negotiations and lowest-common denominator decision-making
(Hodson 2019); and
● A neo-functionalist emphasis on the role of supranational and transnational actors,
as well as financial market interdependence, which encouraged euro area members
to seek “optimal” common solutions (Niemann and Ioannou 2015).3
Lesson 3. While the contributors of the Special Issue do not explicitly attempt to test the
explanatory power of these complementary theories, they do offer interesting insights on
how decisions are taken. Mourlon-Druol (2020) and Henning (2020) show that
a historical institutionalist perspective is of critical importance to understand institu-
tional change in the EU after 2008. Specifically, Mourlon-Druol (2020) demonstrates the
role of models that have been discussed and explored in the past. Such “off-the-shelf”
models arguably become particularly attractive solutions when a heightened urgency
emerges due to a crisis. The case discussed by Henning (2020) offers further support of
the conjecture that chosen paths in times of crisis are inspired by approaches and models
previously conceptualized or adopted. He stresses the continuing role of the US as
a catalyzer for change in the EU during times of crisis. By contrast, Schoeller (2020) is
in our view best understood from an intergovernmentalist viewpoint. He shows that the
German government opposed burden-sharing of the cost of the crises among EU
member states. Burden-sharing through EU level solutions or direct transfers between
member states was not deemed to be in the national interest of Germany.
At the time of writing this introduction, European countries are in various stages of
physical distancing measures due to the worldwide COVID-19 outbreak. Although the
COVID-19 outbreak started as a purely public health crisis, the measures to fight it have
enormous implications for the EU economy, the internal market, public finances, and
possibly also financial stability (Alexandrovich 2020). Observers wonder how long this
period will last and whether the corona crisis will be a transformative or merely
a temporal upset.
The lessons we draw from this Special Issue suggest that the corona crisis offers an
important window of opportunity for institutional, hence transformative, change.
Presently, this crisis has drawn the attention of national governments towards local
stimulus measures and the potential of nationalizing key industries (Reuters 2020).
Seeing that crises clarify the need for new goals and institutions one would expect
some public health initiatives at the EU level, as well as policy discussions and institu-
tional development in the areas of public finance and macroeconomic policy
coordination.
We learnt that crises build consensus. In April 2020, a consensus emerged in the
Eurogroup to offer financial support to member states that are hit severely by the corona
crisis, so that those who do not have sufficient fiscal space can take appropriate action to
fight this crisis. However, there is no consensus as of yet regarding the instrument to
provide financial support. Two options are being considered for crisis relief funding: (1)
namely provide funding through existing institutions, such as the European Investment
Bank (EIB) or the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); or (2) create what is essentially
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a new institution, namely Eurobonds. Lesson 3 provides insights into both short- and
medium-term responses to crises. In the short term its implication would be that
financial support to member states will be provided through the EIB or the ESM, not
a new institution, such as Eurobonds. Yet, the medium-term implication of this lesson
would be that the topic of Eurobonds will remain on the agenda during the corona crisis,
possibly in the context of a discussion to fund modest expenses on a public good at the
EU level. The discussions of whether to set up Eurobonds had member states divided on
whether to support the goal in principle. Even among those who were supportive of the
idea, there was lack of clarity on the institutional structure, the legal provision, and rules
that would support such a goal (Alfageme 2020; Financial Times 2020).
In summary, the current economic crisis facing the EU as a result of COVID-19 is
indeed garnering consensus on the need for a joint response. At the same it is both
highlighting the fissures in policy preferences among member states and is relying on
institutional proposals that are already on-hand. Indeed, the lessons from this Special
Issue suggest the corona crisis will lead to developments as identified by Demertzis and
Wolff (2020), namely further progress towards completion of the Banking Union, as well
as funding and delivery of some additional public goods at the EMU level. Whether or
not these can be achieved will depend on the path chosen.
Notes
1. The contributors of this Special Issue and a related forthcoming symposium came together
for a two-day workshop in February 2017 at the University of Victoria in Canada, funded by
a grant through the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).
2. Numerous excellent works already exist which outline the timeline of the crises and/or the
detail of the responses. Examples include Welch (2011) and Howarth and Verdun (2020).
3. This list is not exhaustive. There are also a number of analyses that draw on these or
a combinations of these theoretical traditions to explain EU institutional changes in light of
the financial and sovereign debt crisis (e.g. Jones, Keleman, and Meunier 2016;
Schimmelfennig 2018).
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